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THE FARM BILL OF 2002, THE WTO, AND POOR AFRICAN
FARMERS: CAN THEY CO-EXIST?
Vance E. Hendrixt
I. INTRODUCTION
One critic of globalization has said: "[i]deas, knowledge, art,
hospitality, travel-these are the things which should of their nature be
international. But let goods be homespun whenever it is reasonably and
conveniently possible."1  In economic terms, globalization refers to
internationalization, international economic integration, and
interdependence! More specifically, these terms refer to the flow of
"goods, services, people, capital, ideas, and technology across national
boundaries."'  In increasing this flow, two significant contributions to
globalization have been dismantling trade barriers and establishing trade
laws in the post-World War II era.4 Trade laws operate on two distinct
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1. Michael Lind, Free Trade Fallacy, NEW AM. FOUND., Jan. 1, 2003, at
http://www.newamerica.net/index.cfm?pg=article&DoclD=1080 (last visited Sept. 12, 2004)
(quoting John Maynard Keynes).
2. STEPHEN D. COHEN ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF U.S. FOREIGN TRADE POLICY:
ECONOMICS, POLITICS, LAWS, AND ISSUES 313 (2d ed. 2003).
3. Id. at 314.
4. Id.
TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L.
levels, national and global.' The national level encompasses those laws
subject to the jurisdiction of the particular national government
implementing the law,6 while the global level includes the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the World Trade
Organization (WTO) regulations; it encompasses "rules and procedures
[that] apply to sovereign governments that are voluntary signatories to
bilateral, regional, or multilateral agreements."7  The global level of
influence, in effect, promotes globalization that has resulted in world
markets becoming increasingly integrated, with numerous countries
relying on one another for market survival.
Not surprisingly, the United States is one of the primary players in the
world market, producing large portions of many of the world's
commodities.' United States farmers account for the production of twelve
percent of the world's rice exports and over a quarter of the world's wheat
exports (2.8 million and 24 million tons per year respectively)."'
Additionally, United States exports of coarse grains dominate world
markets, accounting for almost sixty percent of exports."l Finally, the
United States is a significant producer of cotton, exporting twenty percent
of the world's cotton every year.12  The result of this substantial
agricultural export activity in which the United States is engaged has
proven detrimental to world market prices, which have become
increasingly dependent upon the prices set by United States exports;
consequently, small farmers, both internationally and domestically, that
produce the impacted products have suffered many ill economic effects.13
The impact that the flood of commodities from the United States
exporters has had on world markets, particularly price depression, tends to
suggest in the most basic economic terms that production and output
5. Id. at 150.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. See generally MELAKU GEBOYE DESTA, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS: FROM GATT 1947 TO THE WTO AGREEMENT ON
AGRICULTURE 1-11 (2002).
9. See generally Sabyasachi Mitra, U.S. Farm Bill 2002: Its Implication for World
Agriculture Markets, INT'L DEv. ECON. ASSOCIATES (IDEAs), May 17, 2002, at
http://www.networkideas.orgfthemeslagriculturelmay2OO2/agl7_USFarm-Bill 2002.htm
(last visited Sept. 12, 2004).
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. See generally id.
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should be slowed to meet the lower demands of the market.14 However, in
contrast to this apparent need, the Bush Administration passed an
aggressive Farm Bill in 200215 that in many ways contradicted not only the
United States' commitments to the World Trade Organization (WTO), but
may undermine the impact of the commitments kept by other countries
irreparably damaging the economies of many developing nations. 16 Farm
Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 (U.S. Farm Bill) subsidizes
many American farmers, giving them an artificial advantage in world
markets. 7 A subsidy is a relatively simple economic tool, currently
employed by many of the world's larger nations; it is "a financial
contribution given by a government or any public body within the territory
of a WTO Member which confers a benefit to a specific industry., 18 Some
subsidies, such as those termed "Actionable" subsidies, were actually
allowable under the GATT and the Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures (SCM)) 9 However, continuing after the creation
of the WTO, "Actionable subsidies are [still] tolerated by WTO Members
provided that they do not (a) cause injury to the domestic industry of
another Member; (b) nullify or impair the benefits other Members are
accruing under the SCM Agreement; or (c) cause serious prejudice to the
interests of another Member., 20 It is unfortunate that any subsidies are
allowed to distort the market, and it is tragic that so many nations have
found ways to circumvent the prohibitions and regulations in this area.2 In
like manner, the United States has avoided its commitments to the WTO
by granting substantial assistance to primarily large-scale American
22farmers. These subsidies allow American farmers to produce more
products at lower costs than their world market competitors, creating an
unfair economic advantage in favor of the large corporate farmers in the
United States and causing significant injury to both struggling farmers
from developing countries as well as many of the small single-family
American farmers.
14. id.
15. The Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-171, 116 Stat.
134 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.).
16. See generally Mitra, supra note 9.
17. Id.
18. Mark Clough, Subsidies and the WTO Jurisprudence, 8(4) INT'LTRADE LAW & REG.
109 (2002).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. See generally Mitra, supra note 9.
22. Id.
2004]
TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L.
This comment focuses on the interactions between the WTO
agreements and the U.S. Farm Bill addressing specifically the conflicts
between the commitments made by WTO countries (particularly the
United States and the countries comprising the European Union), and the
impact that the U.S. Farm Bill has and will continue to have on world
markets. Part II lays the foundation by examining the creation and
functions of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and how its
deficiencies led to the establishment of the World Trade Organization.
Furthermore, it addresses the 2003 Cancun negotiation round and the
potential impact and failures of its discussions. Part III addresses the
passage of the U.S. Farm Bill and some of the central issues surrounding
its implementation, particularly the adverse impact on world markets. Part
IV addresses trade liberalization in general and the concerns of those
world markets impacted by the U.S. Farm Bill and briefly discusses the
European Union's role in trade liberalization.
II. FROM THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE TO THE
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION
A. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GA TT)
From its inception in 1947, the GATT was an agreement created to
provide principles and guidelines under which cooperating countries could
gradually liberalize trade practices and policies. 23 Through eight rounds of
trade negotiations, spanning nearly half a century, and concluding with the
Uruguay Round (1986-1994), various commitments were made for a
significant reduction of tariffs on industrial products as well as lowered
24trade barriers. Prior to the Uruguay Round and the agreement to phase
out export restraints, the United States regularly used "voluntary" export1 5
restraint agreements between numerous countries. In the years following
the Great Depression and World War II, some countries caused
substantial economic injury by raising tariffs and imposing production
quotas devaluing the imposing country's currency, causing further
26
economic injury. Sometimes these actions temporarily improved the
trade balance and improved the country's employment rates, but these
local improvements were made at the expense of other nations and the
23. COHEN ET AL., supra note 2, at 183.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 156.
26. Id. at 183-84.
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world markets. 27  To combat these ill effects and to prevent future
economic depressions, the leading nations of the world met at Bretton
Woods, New Hampshire and developed the provisional rules for the
21International Trade Organization (ITO). Shortly thereafter, during the
291947 Conference on Trade and Employment, the GATT was adopted .
Quickly the GATT's relevance surpassed ITO principles, and GATT
membership expanded; under the constantly changing economic
conditions, its provisions would continue to develop and adapt to the
world and market demands for the next forty-seven years.30
1. Foundational Principles of the GATT"
Despite numerous problems with the organization's structure and
means of enforcement and dispute resolution, the GATT did have its
merits; particularly, the core principles that would later prove instrumental
in the formation of the World Trade Organization." Foremost among
these foundational principles were the most-favored-nation rule (MFN),
"the reduction and binding of national tariffs, [and] the rule of national
12treatment," as well as the prohibition of non- tariff barriers.
First, the most-favored-nation rule was simply a principle of fairness,
requiring that nations giving favored treatment to one GATT Member
Nation must also extend the same treatment to the other GATT Member
Nations.33 "The MFN clause thus provides every contracting party the
assurance that their goods will be treated on equal basis with the like
27. See id.
28. Id.
29. COHEN ET AL., supra note 2, at 184.
30. Id.
31. See generally THE WTO SECRETARIAT, GUIDE TO THE URUGUAY ROUND
AGREEMENTS 38-39 (1999) [hereinafter WTO SECRETARIATI.
32. Id. at 39.
33. Id. at 39-40. "This MFN, or non-discrimination, obligation applies to customs duties
and charges of any kind connected with importing and exporting, as well as to internal taxes
and charges, and to all the rules by which such duties, taxes and charges are applied." Id.
Addressed in the General Agreement, the "principle of non-discrimination stipulates that
'any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by any contracting party to any
product originating in or destined for any other country shall be accorded immediately and
unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for the territories of all other
contracting parties."' DESTA, supra note 8, at 23 (quoting The General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, art. I, § 1, 61 Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194,
available at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal e/gatt47 01 e.htm (last visited Sept. 11,
2004) [hereinafter GATT]).
2004]
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products of other contracting parties, 34 thus creating "the obligation, on
every contracting party, to treat all contracting parties in the same
manner."3 5 This equalization is in large part responsible for much of the
GATT's success in the reduction, and in some instances, complete
elimination of tariffs." Even though this principle does not address the
distinction between domestically produced and imported products,37 this
anti-protectionist principle has survived and is a core part of WTO
principles.38
Second, the reduction and binding of national tariffs requires
countries to make a commitment to a stated maximum import duty "or
restriction that they will apply to imports of specified types of goods."39
However, most nations found ways to circumvent these commitments by
using non-tariff devices, such as export subsidies, to continue domestic
economic protection.4 ° Unfortunately, at the negotiations establishing this
principle, many developing countries did not participate in the
negotiations to establish binding of national tariffs and consequently have
no schedule for binding their tariffs.4' This is one of the primary issues that
remains unresolved and continues to be a key element of negotiations,
42particularly where it concerns agriculture.
Third, the rule of national treatment compliments the most-favored-
nation rule.43 The principle provides that all of a country's products from
their respective "trading partners [be placed] on equal terms with one
another, the national treatment principle puts those products on equal
terms also with the products of the importing country itself."44 Like the
most-favored-nation rule, this applies to internal taxes and other charges.45
Found in Article III of the GATT, the national treatment rule deals
primarily with "the use of internal, domestic, measures on imported
products." 46 The thrust of this measure was to prevent countries from
34. DESTA, supra note 8, at 23.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. WTO SECRETARIAT, supra note 31, at 39.
39. Id. at 40.
40. DESTA, supra note 8, at 24-25.
41. WTO SECRETARIAT, supra note 31, at 40.
42. See generally DESTA, supra note 8.
43. See generally WTO SECRETARIAT, supra note 31.
44. Id. at 40.
45. WTO SECRETARIAT, supra note 31, at 40.
46. DESTA, supra note 8, at 24. The pertinent provisions from the GATT, Article III
follow:
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avoiding mandates that sought to liberalize trade under tariff reduction by
employing internal measures that would effectively distinguish between
imported products and domestically produced products 7 In essence, this
mandated treatment calls for economic product equality, that is, once the
imported product has entered the country, foreign and domestic products
are treated the same for purposes of internal taxation. 4' The most
significant implication of this principle is that it allows for protection of
domestic suppliers only through action at the frontier or upon entrance
49into the country.
2. Structure of the GATT
The original intention of creating first the ITO, and subsequently the
GATT, was to establish a body to handle international trade concerns and
economic cooperation. ° Initially, the agreement was a package of trade
1. The contracting parties recognize that internal taxes and other internal
charges, and laws, regulations and requirements affecting the internal
sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use of
products, and internal quantitative regulations requiring the mixture,
processing or use of products in specified amounts or proportions, should
not be applied to imported or domestic products so as to afford protection
to domestic production.
2. The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the
territory of any other contracting party shall not be subject, directly or
indirectly, to internal taxes or other internal charges of any kind in excess
of those applied, directly or indirectly, to like domestic products.
Moreover, no contracting party shall otherwise apply internal taxes or
other internal charges to imported or domestic products in a manner
contrary to the principles set forth in paragraph 1.
4. The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the
territory of any other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no
less favourable than that accorded to like products of national origin in
respect of all laws, regulations and requirements affecting their internal
sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use. The
provisions of this paragraph shall not prevent the application of
differential internal transportation charges which are based exclusively on
the economic operation of the means of transport and not on the
nationality of the product.
GATT, supra, note 33, at art. Ill.
47. DESTA, supra note 8, at 24.
48. WTO SECRETARIAT, supra note 31, at 40.
49. Id. at 41.
50. Understanding the WTO: Basics, The GA TT years: from Havana to Marrakesh,
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, available at
20041
TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L.
rules and tariff concessions.5' Numerous trade rounds followed in which
countries sought to negotiate issues of concern such as tariff reduction,
international trade liberalization, anti-dumping agreements, and the
elimination of trade barriers.52 Additionally, there were some provisions
that sought to address early concerns regarding subsidies and, no doubt,
were a model for later WTO agricultural subsidy rules.53 Despite the
establishment of the GATT and its founders' good intentions, agricultural
subsidies went largely unchecked.54
http://www.wto.org/englishlthewto-e/whatis-e/tif_e/fact4_e.htm (last visited Sept. 14, 2004)
[hereinafter Understanding the WTO].
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. See generally GATr, supra note 33. The pertinent provisions of the Act follow:
1. If any contracting party grants or maintains any subsidy, including any
form of income or price support, which operates directly or indirectly to
increase exports of any product from, or to reduce imports of any product
into, its territory, it shall notify the CONTRACTING PARTIES in
writing of the extent and nature of the subsidization, of the estimated
effect of the subsidization on the quantity of the affected product or
products imported into or exported from its territory and of the
circumstances making the subsidization necessary. In any case in which it
is determined that serious prejudice to the interests of any other
contracting party is caused or threatened by any such subsidization, the
contracting party granting the subsidy shall, upon request, discuss with the
other contracting party or parties concerned, or with the
CONTRACTING PARTIES, the possibility of limiting the subsidization.
Section B - Additional Provisions on Export Subsidies
2. The contracting parties recognize that the granting by a contracting
party of a subsidy on the export of any product may have harmful effects
for other contracting parties, both importing and exporting, may cause
undue disturbance to their normal commercial interests, and may hinder
the achievement of the objectives of this Agreement.
3. Accordingly, contracting parties should seek to avoid the use of
subsidies on the export of primary products. If, however, a contracting
party grants directly or indirectly any form of subsidy which operates to
increase the export of any primary product from its territory, such subsidy
shall not be applied in a manner which results in that contracting party
having more than an equitable share of world export trade in that
product, account being taken of the shares of the contracting parties in
such trade in the product during a previous representative period, and any
special factors which may have affected or may be affecting such trade in
the product.
Id. at art. XVI.
54. Tashi Kaul, The Elimination of Export Subsidies and the Future of Net-Food Importing
Developing Countries in the WTO, 24 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 383, 407 (2000).
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The 1947 GATI permitted many subsidies for agricultural products
that were considered "primary," but prohibited export subsidies on many
of the industrial exported products.5 Although GATT principles and
negotiations were well intentioned, the GATT was not without its
problems, many of which would be resolved in the Uruguay Round
negotiations." Among its problems, the GATT, rather than establishing
an internal means of supporting itself, used financing and staffing
resources provided by the Interim Commission for the International Trade
Organization (ICITO).57 Additionally, the GATI"s system of dispute
resolution had proven cumbersome and inefficient over the years." All of
this would change with the establishment of the World Trade
Organization.59
3. The Uruguay Round of Negotiations
Although the commitments achieved through the GATT continue to
have a lasting impact on current international trade policies, its structure
and governing principles proved too inefficient and outdated to continue
effectively.60 Additionally, as the world economy became more globalized,
61it became clear that the GATT was in need of major modifications.
Toward the end of the twentieth century, trade became increasingly more
complex, and the outmoded GATT had numerous loopholes that were
6'being heavily exploited, particularly in agricultural areas. The Uruguay
Round was the eighth round of multilateral trade negotiations under the
GATT since 1948.6' Negotiations in this round were significant to
agricultural trade, and these talks continued at regular intervals for eight
55. Id.
56. See id.
57. WTO SECRETARIAT, supra note 31, at 2.
58. Id.
59. See generally id.
60. See generally DES'rA, supra note 8.
61. Understanding the WTO, supra note 50.
62. Id.
63. The World Trade Organization and Agriculture, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., FOREIGN
AGRIC. SERVICE, July 2002, at http://www.fas.usda.gov/infoffactsheetswto.html (last
visited Nov. 24, 2004). Other key trade negotiation rounds include the Tokyo Round
and the Kennedy Round. See generally Pre-WTO Legal Texts, WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION, at http://www.wto.org/english/docs-elegal-e/prewto-legal-e.htm (last
visited Nov. 24, 2004) [hereinafter Pre-WTO].
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years between 1986 and 1994. 4 By the start of the Uruguay Round the
urgent need for reform was becoming apparent.65
Government support and protection for agriculture had been increasing
globally, and all countries felt the consequences in terms of rising
budget expenditures, depressed markets, trade frictions, and the overall
drain on economic growth. International agricultural markets were
distorted by the use of high price supports and restrictive import
barriers, which protected domestic producers while denying competitive
producers the opportunity to sell their products in these markets. High
price supports in some countries led to surplus production that was
dumped on world markets with the aid of export subsidies. 6
During this round, countries reached an agreement that established
some much needed long-term objectives.67 Specifically, the round resulted
in an Agreement on Agriculture with goals targeted at what has come to
be known as the three pillars: Market Access, Export Subsidies, and
Domestic Support.68
The first pillar, Market Access, is a provision requiring that tariffs
replace non-tariff barriers to market access. 69 This was to be accomplished
by "tariffication" or the establishment of a tariff-only regime.7°
Tariffication refers to the implementation of tariff reduction
commitments.1 It follows that market access would be furthered by
reducing the established tariffs and binding the agricultural tariffs 2 This
process sought to eliminate both existing and prospective tariffs.73 This
commitment had the interests of the exporter in mind, enabling him to
understand and predict tariffs that had formerly been unpredictable trade
74barriers placed on his exports.
The second pillar, Export Subsidies, would prove to be pivotal in later
negotiations, particularly the Cancun, Mexico negotiations.75 The WTO
64. The World Trade Organization and Agriculture, supra note 63.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. WTO SECRETARIAT, supra note 31, at 52.
71. DESTA, supra note 8, at 73.
72. WTO SECRETARIAT, supra note 31, at 52.
73. DESTA, supra note 8, at 73.
74. See The World Trade Organization and Agriculture, supra note 63.
75. See generally WTO SECRETARIAT, supra note 31.
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was the first organization to implement rules governing export subsidies."
Competitive world markets are easily distorted; their products are easily
displaced by wealthier nations that provide subsidies to fund their
economic interests.77 Because subsidies allow producers to sell products for
lower prices than what is needed to offset their costs, the market price is
lowered as a result of the government assistance." The United States and
the European Union are two such entities that subsidize much of their
agricultural exports.79
The third pillar, Domestic Support policies, dictates how governments
use a variety of measures to support their agricultural producers.8° A
country's individual policies "can impose costs on other countries and
world markets by encouraging overproduction or inducing production of
specific commodities."" This principle was dealt with more efficiently
once negotiations in agriculture and the world markets fell under the WTO
umbrella. 2
After formation, the WTO developed a system by which Members
could differentiate between serious trade distorting threats and those that
impose only an insignificant risk of distortion." The former threat was
labeled the "amber" box while the latter was labeled the "green" box.
4
Clear from the color designations, which are akin to the colors common to
traffic signals, the "green" box risks are acceptable, and no action is likely
to be taken by the organization, while "amber" box risks are potentially
problematic.85 If a policy is labeled "amber," the country must be careful
not to "exceed the level of support to which they have agreed as measured
by their Aggregate Measurement of Support (AMS)," which totals
"commodity by commodity, a country's support measures linked to
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Fact Sheet: USTR Describes Farm Bill in Context of Other WTO Members' Support
Limits, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, Sept. 9, 2003, at
http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/econ/wto/03091003.htm (last visited Sept. 7, 2004)
[hereinafter USTR Describes Farm Bill].
80. The World Trade Organization and Agriculture, supra note 63.
81. Id.
82. See id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. See generally Pre-WTO, supra note 63.
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production or prices., 8' For example, the United States ceiling for
"amber" box distortions is $19.1 billion; this is significantly lower than the
ceilings for other large developed countries. 7 Another characterization of
risks involves direct payments related to some production-limiting policies
that distort trade, but are not subject to the reduction requirements
because they fall under the "blue" box exemption.8 A "blue" box
designation is essentially the same as an "amber" box designation with
conditions, which often prevent the organization from taking action.89
Usually, subsidies are categorized in the "blue" box if the support requires
farmers to limit production.9° While this designation system, developed by
the WTO, is useful in characterizing risks, the problems with subsidies and
other trade distorting factors are responsible for the establishment of the
World Trade Organization and subsequently the employment of the box
system9'
B. The World Trade Organization
The creation of the WTO was a direct result of the Uruguay RoundS - 92
Multilateral Trade Negotiations; the primary purpose of its establishment
in 1995 was to implement the agreements reached in the Uruguay Round.93
However, another practical effect of the WTO was the replacement of the
GATT, which set out many of the fundamental obligations regarding the
trade of goods.94 The GATT was successful in many arenas, specifically in
86. The World Trade Organization and Agriculture, supra note 63. A country's support
measures may include "price supports, marketing loans, payments based on acreage or
number of livestock, and certain subsidized loan programs." Id.
87. Farm Bill 2002, Title III. Agricultural Trade and Aid, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
AGRICULTURE, available at
http://www.fas.usda.gov/info/factsheets/fb2002/backgrounder.htm (last visited Sept. 18,
2004) [hereinafter Farm Bill].
88. The World Trade Organization and Agriculture, supra note 63.
89. Agriculture Negotiations: Background Fact Sheet, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION,
at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/agric-e/agboxese.htm (last visited Sept. 17,
2004).
90. Id.
91. See id.
92. See WTO SECRETARIAT, supra note 31, at 1. The WTO was established by 16 articles
found within the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization of April
15, 1994. Id.
93. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2000 ANNUAL REPORT: II. WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION, available at
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document -Library/Reports Publications/2001/2001 -Trade Poli
cy-Agenda/asset-uploadjfile5l6 6491.pdf (last visited Oct. 15, 2004 ) [hereinafter 2000
ANNUAL REPORT].
94. Id.
[Vol. 12.1
THE FARM BILL OF 2002
lowering tariffs; however, by the 1970s and 1980s, many countries had
devised other forms of economic protection to by-pass the tariff
reduction.9 Growing unemployment and factory closures led to a
subsidies race among many developed nations trying to maintain their hold
on the agriculture market.96 Although the WTO is a negotiating body,
functioning much as the GATT did before it, the GAT[ still exists and
functions as the WTO's umbrella treaty, providing guidance in the area of
trade in goods.97
Currently, there are 147 Member Countries of the WTO, the majority
of which are developing countries. 98 This organization serves as a platform
for these countries to raise trade concerns regarding policies and trade
partners in a variety of economic arenas.99 All of the WTO agreements
must be followed by all WTO Members and are thus considered
,'multilateral. ""'°
1. Primary WTO Issues
The WTO addresses and provides a means to resolve a number of
important global issues.101 The preeminent issues include: protection of
intellectual property rights, trade in agricultural services and goods,
establishing and maintaining a means of settling trade disputes between
Member Countries, and liberalization of trade.'02 Among its numerous
objectives, one long-term goal is the substantial reduction of agricultural
trade protection, including the elimination of export subsidies.1 °3
Additionally, the WTO, like the GATT, seeks to expand trade and
encourage the effective use of the world's resources along with improving
the standard of living and achieving full employment.1 4  Because there
were numerous problems with interpretation and enforcement of GATT
95. Understanding the WTO, supra note 50.
96. Id.
97. Understanding the WTO: Basics, The Uruguay Round, What Happened to GATT?,
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/whatise/tif-e/fact5-e.htm (last visited Sept. 18, 2004).
98. Understanding the WTO: Developing Countries, Overview, WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/whatise/tife/devl-e.htm (last visited Sept. 18, 2004).
99. Id.
100. 2000 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 93.
101. See id.
102. Id.
103. Kevin C. Kennedy, International Trade in Agriculture: Where We've Been, Where We
Are, and Where We're Headed, 10 MICH. ST. U.-DCL J. INT'L LAW, 1, 3 (Spring 2001).
104. WTO SECRETARIAT, supra note 31, at 3.
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provisions, the "rules of the WTO [were implemented and] exist primarily
to create a predictable and liberal economic . . . environment for
international trade," clearly apparent from its structure.105
2. Structure of the WTO Agreement
The structure of the WTO agreement is quite simple.'06  The
agreement is comprised of six parts, some of which include: the agreement
to establish the WTO, agreements for the broad areas of trade, which are
goods, services, and intellectual property, as well as provisions for dispute
settlement, and review of government trade policies.0 7 The organization
conducts formal meetings every two years, 1°8 with at least one
representative from each Member Country attending these meetings.
Oftentimes, there are general meetings held at the WTO headquarters in
Geneva several times a year.' °9 The WTO is comprised of numerous
committees and subsidiary councils that are responsible to the WTO." °
Article VI of the WTO agreement grants the WTO a permanent staff,
consisting of a Secretariat and a staff appointed by the Secretariat.''
105. Id. at 30.
106. World Trade Organization, Understanding the WTO: The Agreements, Overview: A
Navigational Guide, at http://www.wto.org/englishlthewtoe/whatis e/tife/agrml-e.htm
(last visited Sept. 18, 2004).
107. Id.
108. Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, What is the World Trade Organization
(WTO)?, Apr. 12, 2002, at www.ustr.gov/wto/wtofact3.html (on file with the Tulsa Journal
of Comparative & International Law).
109. Id.
110. WTO SECRETARIAT, supra note 31, at 6-9. Article IV lists numerous WTO bodies,
but the list is not exclusive. Many of the councils and committees can form sub-committees
where necessary. Id.
111. Id. at 10. The pertinent portions of Article VI follow:
1. There shall be a Secretariat of the WTO (hereinafter referred to as
"the Secretariat") headed by a Director-General.
2. The Ministerial Conference shall appoint the Director-General and
adopt regulations setting out the powers, duties, conditions of service
and term of office of the Director-General.
3. The Director-General shall appoint the members of the staff of the
Secretariat and determine their duties and conditions of service in
accordance with regulations adopted by the Ministerial Conference.
4. The responsibilities of the Director-General and of the staff of the
Secretariat shall be exclusively international in character. In the discharge
of their duties, the Director-General and the staff of the Secretariat shall
not seek or accept instructions from any government or any other
authority external to the WTO. They shall refrain from any action which
might adversely reflect on their position as international officials. The
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Interestingly, the Secretariat and staff are independent international civil
servants and do not answer to or work for any specific nation, thus
encouraging the development and enforcement of international objectives
independent of regional or national influence. Article VII of the WTO
Agreement sets out the governing principles regarding budget and finance
regulations." The Regulations detail that the WTO is financed by
contributions from Member Nations based on their total exports of goods
and services, a major change in structure from its predecessor, the GATT,
which only considered the total exports of goods. 14 "The basic principle is
that contributions are proportionate to the share of each country's exports
and imports in the total trade among members."".5  Additionally, the
agreement provides that all Member Nations, including developing
countries, provide a minimum of a 0.03% contribution with less than that
amount of the WTO's total trade.'6
C. The Agreement on Agriculture
Agriculture was one of the most problematic issues negotiated in the
Uruguay Round and resulted in not only the creation of the WTO, but also
the Agreement on Agriculture. 117 Although the GATI made attempts to
address agricultural issues, trade in agriculture has been continually
plagued by restrictions and distortions.'
8
The GATT rules, as well as accession conditions and waivers,
permitted GATT Members to maintain greater protection against
agricultural imports; also it provides wider-ranging subsidies for
agricultural exports than was allowed for industrial goods. Few market
opening commitments were made, so that the degree of binding achieved
Members of the WTO shall respect the international character of the
responsibilities of the Director-General and of the staff of the Secretariat
and shall not seek to influence them in the discharge of their duties.
WTO Analytical Index: Marrakesh Agreement, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/res-e/booksp-e/analytic-index-e/wtoagree_03- .htm#articleV
I (last visited Sept. 18, 2004).
112. See generally WTO SECRETARIAT, supra note 31, at 10.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 10-11.
115. Id. at 11. Unlike under the GATT, the share is calculated based on the percentage of
goods and services not just the percentage of goods. Id.
116. Id.
117. Agriculture Summary, CTR. FOR INT'L DEVELOPMENT AT HARVARD UNIVERSITY (last
updated Jan. 2004), at http://www.cid.harvard.edu/cidtrade/issues/agriculture.html (last
visited Oct. 15, 2004).
118. WTO SECRETARIAT, supra note 31, at 51.
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was far less than for industrial products, and quantitative restrictions were
widely applied."9
During the Uruguay Round, negotiators sought to overcome obstacles
imposed by non-tariff international trade barriers in agriculture.2 ° The
commitments made by WTO Members were aimed at "making agricultural
trade fairer and more market-oriented."'' The negotiations resulted in a
conversion of the non-tariff barriers to tariffs and the binding of those
112tariffs. The WTO Agreement on Agriculture primarily focused on
reform in "market access, domestic support, export competition, 123 and
sanitary/phytosanitary issues.',
124
In the past, GATT rules permitted subsidies for agriculture
producers;12 however, the Agreement on Agriculture distinguished itself
from the GATT and the trends following its implementation and
enforcement by allowing subsidies only if they met certain exceptions.
26
The market access provisions of the agreement called for a thirty-six
percent reduction in tariffs for developed countries and a twenty-four
percent reduction for developing countries over six and ten year periods
respectively.
The tariffication package also provides for the maintenance of current
access opportunities and the establishment of minimum access tariff quotas
(at reduced-tariff rates) where current access is less than three percent of
domestic consumption. These minimum access tariff quotas are to be
118
expanded to five percent over the implementation period.
The commitments made in the Agreement on Agriculture arguably
had an adverse impact on many developed and wealthy countries.
Under this agreement, Members promised to reduce import tariffs, export
subsidies, and "total aggregate support to agricultural producers," thus not
119. Id.
120. DESTA, supra note 8, at 62.
121. WTO SECRETARIAT, supra note 31, at 52.
122. DESTA, supra note 8, at 62.
123. Agriculture Summary, supra note 117; see also GATT, supra note 53, at art. XVI.
124. Id. Sanitary and phytosanitary issues arc not agricultural issues per se, but include
environmental protection, public health and safety concerns as well as food security. Id.
125. WTO SECRETARIAT, supra note 31, at 59.
126. Id.
127. Legal texts: The WTO Agreements, Agreement on Agriculture, WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION, available at www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal e/ursum e.htm (last visited
Sept. 16, 2004).
128. Id.
129. See generally id.
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providing the expected support to their farmers.13 In contrast, developing
and least developed countries stood to benefit the most if the
commitments were kept. The developing countries still had to reduce
tariffs, subsidies, and agricultural assistance, but these changes were to be
implemented much more gradually.13 In spite of the well intentioned and
seemingly aggressive Uruguay Round initiatives and subsequent WTO
negotiations, agriculture remains the area of international trade most
distorted by export subsidies.'33
D. Cancun, Mexico - The Midpoint of the Doha Negotiations
The most recent trade round, termed the Doha Development Round,
began in Doha, Qatar in 2001.3 Continuing with the 2003 midpoint
meetings in Cancun, Mexico, all nations hoped for progress. Viewed as a
moderate success, the Doha mandate was one result of the round calling
for specified methods to be implemented by each Member Nation in
reaching trade liberalization goals. 36  The Doha mandate required
timetables and targets to reduce tariff barriers and improve market
access. 37 Unfortunately, the mandate deadlines were not met, and many
of the Member Countries scrambled to be ready for the meetings in
Cancun. In particular, European countries were unable to decide on the
most appropriate reform measures to be taken concerning the Common
Agriculture Policy (CAP).39 In contrast to the Doha negotiations, the
Cancun meetings failed because little was accomplished with regard to the
Agricultural issues facing much of the developing world.140
130. Agriculture Summary, supra note 117.
131. See generally DESTA, supra note 8.
132. Agriculture Summary, supra note 117.
133. Kaul, supra note 54, at 407-08.
134. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2004 TRADE POLICY AGENDA AND 2003 ANNUAL
REPORT: II. WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 1, available at
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document-Library/Reports-Publications/2004/2004-Trade-Poli
cyAgenda/asset-uploadjfile665_4752.pdf (last visited Oct. 15, 2004 ) [hereinafter 2003
ANNUAL REPORT].
135. Steven Pearlstein, Trade and Trade-Offs, WASH. POST, Sept. 10, 2003, at E01.
136. Agriculture Summary, supra note 117.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. See generally Robert B. Zoellick, America Will Not Wait for the Won't-do Countries,
FIN. TIMES (London), Sept. 22, 2003, at 23.
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One key topic for negotiation involved excessive subsidies given by
the United States and European Union to their respective farmers.'
Some allege that the "subsidies result[ed] in huge excesses of artificially
low-priced fruits, vegetables and grains being dumped on world markets,
making it impossible for farmers in poorer nations to compete."'14 2 Despite
the possibility of lowering prices and the opportunity to remedy the
problems through negotiations, the Cancun negotiations accomplished
relatively little.14
1. Problems in the Cancun Meetings
Unfortunately, the recent WTO negotiations in Cancun, Mexico did
not go as smoothly as hoped, nor were the anticipated objectives
achieved.'" Developing countries demanded an end to high tariffs and
agricultural subsidies that adversely impact them, but were unwilling toS 141
make concessions to developed countries. When the results of the
negotiations seemed to take a turn away from the objectives many poorer
nations sought, a group of African, Caribbean, Asian, and Latin American
. . 146
countries walked out of the negotiations.
To make matters more complex, a small group of African nations
were seeking a substantial compensation package totaling more than $300
million, as well as a significant reduction of American and European
Union subsidies to their respective cotton farmers.147  Thought to be
unreasonable by a number of the larger, developed countries, the proposal
was questioned and ultimately denied.4 8 Some critics have noted that
cotton may have been singled out in the negotiations because Europe does
141. See generally Kevin Sullivan, Agriculture on the Table at Trade Talks in Mexico; U.S.
and European Farm Subsidies Come Under Attack, WASH. POST, Sept. 10, 2003, at A12.
142. Id. Dumping occurs when overproduction of a product in one country is then
exported to another country (particularly a developing country) and marketed at a cost far
below what the country's domestic producers of the product can sell for the competing
product. One of the effects of this practice is that the below cost imports may drive farmers
out of their markets. Another effect is that farmers may "find their world market share
undermined by the lower-cost competition." INST. FOR AGRICULTURE AND TRADE POL'Y,
U.S. DUMPING ON WORLD AGRICULTURAL MARKETS 13 (2003), available at
http://www.tradeobservatory.org/library.cfm?filename=United-States-Dumping-on-World
_AgriculturalMa.pdf. (last visited Sept. 18, 2004) [hereinafter U.S. DUMPING].
143. Zoellick, supra note 140.
144. See generally, Elizabeth Becker, Poorer Countries Pull Out of Talks Over World
Trade, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2003, at Al; see also Zoellick, supra note 140.
145. The Cancdin Failure, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2003, at A24.
146. Becker, supra note 144; see also Zoellick, supra note 140.
147. Becker, supra note 144.
148. Zoellick, supra note 140.
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not produce or export significant amounts of cotton. 14 It follows that the
United States is the only large, developed country that would be affected
by this proposal.5 However, the fact that the United States subsidizes its
farmers in amounts approaching $3 billion was probably a more significant
reason for the attention. 5' According to United States Trade
Representative, Robert Zoellick, the United States does not subsidize
cotton and is pushing to eliminate subsidies entirely.152 Furthermore, the
United States does not want to make cotton a symbol of world
development, but wants to reach farmers of all commodities with subsidy
reform.153 Undoubtedly, this breakdown in the negotiation process will set
back the timetable of the WTO, making it difficult to reach their self-
imposed 2005 deadline. Perhaps a more flexible stance taken by the
United States would have resulted in more progress.
2. Americans Take a Cautious Stance
Not surprisingly, at the 2002 WTO meeting in Cancun, the United
States leadership took a guarded stance concerning many of the objectives
on the table at the Cancun negotiations; no doubt, anticipating the
potential impact of an ambitious stance on subsidies. 5 As expected, there
is a split among the American farm lobby between those who see greater
access to the world market as a chance for profit and those who are
116
content with the safety found in their subsidies. Undoubtedly, many
farmers are concerned that an overly aggressive stance could result in the
repeal of the U.S. Farm Bill forcing farmers to respond to market demands
instead of producing at capacity, thus maximizing governmental aid. 57
3. The Cairns Group
The Cairns Group, another faction opposed to the United States'
stance, has heavy interests in the negotiations; it is comprised of fourteen
agricultural exporting countries headed by Australia and including
Uruguay, Thailand, the Philippines, New Zealand, Malaysia, Indonesia,
149. Canclin Targets Cotton, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2003, at A12.
150. See generally id.
151. Id.
152. Zoellick, supra note 140.
153. Id.
154. Becker, supra note 144.
155. Id.
156. The Cancin Failure, supra note 145.
157. Elizabeth Becker, Coming U.S. Vote Figures in Walkout at Trade Talks, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 16, 2003, at A6.
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Hungary, Fiji, Colombia, Chile, Canada, Brazil, and Argentina."' This
group has been at the forefront of the negotiations, supporting the
liberalization of agricultural trade.159 Like many others in the international
community, these countries believe that subsidies divert resources,
preventing the most efficient and valued use of resources. 6°
4. European and United States Farmers Prosper at the Expense of
African Farmers
African farmers are among the hardest hit by the United States' and
European Union's subsidies.1 6' Through legislation such as the U.S. Farm
Bill and CAP, wealthy nations encourage trade distortion. According to
one source, American farmers received in excess of $3 billion in 2002,
163
which equals roughly $200 per farmed acre. Similarly, the European
Union subsidizes its farmers heavily.'9 "The average European cow now
gets a subsidy of more than $2 a day, more than what a quarter of the
world's people live on" per day. 65 Additionally, in the past Europe has
subsidized its farmers, primarily farmers in Greece and Spain, with nearly
166$1 billion per year. What is the result of these seemingly excessive
subsidies? Critics argue that excessive subsidies lead to overproduction,
depression of world prices, and the reduction of many developing nations'
farmers to poverty. 67 In many of these developing nations, "[c]ommunities
are built around discrete industries; lives are devoted to learning the skills
necessary to operate in the field at hand; and ties are formed to particular
geographic places, with few job opportunities other than those in the
dominant industry.'. 68
158. Kennedy, supra note 103, at 2 n.1.
159. Id.
160. Marc Kleiner, Bananas, Airplanes and the WTO: Prohibited Export Subsidies, 10 U.
MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 129 (2002).
161. See generally Elizabeth Becket, African Nations Press for an End to Cotton Subsidies
in the West, N. Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2003, at A5.
162. See generally DESTA, supra note 8.
163. Becker, supra note 161.
164. Pearlstein, supra note 135.
165. Id.
166. Becker, supra note 161.
167. Pearlstein, supra note 135.
168. Ari Afilalo, Not in My Back Yard: Power and Protectionism in U.S. Trade Policy, 34
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 749,766 (2002).
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Significantly, the United States stands to gain from expanded market169
access. Since the majority of the world's consumers do not live in the
United States, and the United States is the largest exporter in the world, it
follows that expanded market access will have a tremendous benefit to
American exporters.7 Exports of United States agricultural products also
generate additional economic activity that ripples through the domestic
economy. According to USDA's Economic Research Service, every dollar
of export creates another $1.47 in supporting activities to process, package,
ship, and finance agricultural products."'
Accordingly, the United States has made aggressive proposals for
reform in agricultural trade; however, these reforms do not seem to fit with
the objectives targeted in the U.S. Farm Bill.' There are two primary
phases to the United States' proposals.17' The first phase calls for the
elimination of export subsidies over a five year period, thus reducing
worldwide tariffs and trade-distorting support. 74 The second phase calls
for the complete elimination of all tariffs and forms of trade distorting
domestic support.
175
Although discouraged by the GATT and counter to the goals of the
WTO, the United States and many countries employ non-tariff protective176
measures. Some have argued that since the trend for the last fifty years
has been toward outlawing protectionism in the world markets, the United
States should follow in like manner.'77 "There is no reason, other than the
need to protect a domestic industry, to exclude a category of goods such as
agricultural goods from GATT disciplines."'78 It is argued by Ari Afilalo
that the answer is not:
in the erection of barriers to trade that are the functional equivalent of a
tariff, but rather, in the multilateral negotiation of labor standards that
169. See generally Trade is Important to U.S. Agriculture, U.S. FOREIGN AGRICULTURAL
SERVICE, available at http://www.fas.usda.gov/itp/wto/tradeimportant.htm (last visited Sept.
18, 2004).
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. The U.S. WTO Agriculture Proposal, U.S. FOREIGN AGRICULTURAL SERVICE,
available at http://www.fas.usda.gov/itp/wto/proposal.htm (last visited Sept. 12, 2004).
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. See generally, DESTA, supra note 8, at 24-25. Under the current WTO regulations, the
U.S. can provide up to $19.1 billion per year in trade-distorting support. USTR Describes
Farm Bill, supra note 79.
177. Afilalo, supra note 168, at 753.
178. Id. at 762.
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may even the playing field and, principally, in the restructuring of the
domestic economies either to improve the competitiveness of declining
industries or to shift production capacity to more competitive sectors.1
79
III. THE UNITED STATES FARM BILL OF 2002
The Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 (U.S. Farm Bill)
has drawn a great deal of criticism from numerous Members of the
WTO.8 ° Signed into law on May 13, 2002 by President George W. Bush,1
the bill effectively benefits the country's large grain and cotton farmers.182
Due to the discretion granted to the United States Secretary of Agriculture
in the bill, the likely result will be economic conditions favorable to the
United States but detrimental to the world markets, particularly those in
113which developing countries seek to compete. Some organizations hold
that "American agricultural policy distorts food prices, frustrates
innovation, limits product diversity and subsidises [sic] a select group of
farmers at enormous public cost."' 84 However, proponents of the bill are
quick to point out that while the United States enjoys a $19.1 billion ceiling
on subsidies, other countries enjoy far more liberal subsidizing standards;
therefore, even if the United States takes full advantage of allowable
subsidies, it still falls short of the European and Japanese expenditures.85
The European Union's ceiling is $60 billion and Japan's policies reflect
trade distortion of approximately $30 billion.86 Some reports estimate that
average spending by the United States in the years between 1999 and 2001
was approximately $24.5 billion, whereas spending under the new U.S.
187Farm Bill promises to be twenty percent less, around $20 billion .
Furthermore, most of the support detailed in the bill is purportedly "non-
trade distorting" support.
179. Id. at 772.
180. Id. at 780.
181. The Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002, supra note 15.
182. Mitra, supra note 9.
183. Afilalo, supra note 168, at 786.
184. Mitra, supra note 9.
185. Farm Bill, supra note 87.
186. Id.
187. U.S. Farm Bill and the WTO Negotiations, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE, Sept. 9, 2003, available at http://www.ustrade-wto.gov/fsfbil1091O.html
(last visited Sept. 16, 2004).
188. Id.
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A. Origins of the U.S. Farm Bill
The bill is a direct result of what appeared to be a farming crisis in the
United States during a period encompassing the late 1990s through 2000.189
Market prices in 2000 were lower than they had been in decades for crops
such as soy beans, wheat, corn, rice, and cotton.' 9° Some critics even
commented that the farm recession was among the worst in American
history, ranking it with the Great Depression and the recessions following
the two World Wars.' 91 Some argue that the bill is political in nature rather
than benevolent, since many of the states producing the products that will
benefit the most from the bill (Midwestern states such as Iowa, Kansas,
Illinois, Indiana, and Minnesota) are also states that helped secure Bush
the presidency in 2000.12
B. Opposition to the U.S. Farm Bill
Ari Afilalo, an opponent of the Farm Bill, argues that Congress could
have tackled the farm recession problem with methods other than the
Farm Bill that would have been less detrimental to developing countries.
93
He states:
[d]irect aid unrelated to price would not have triggered any
international trade concerns. Direct aid could have taken the form of
cash grants to the states or to individuals. Cash grants to the states could
have entailed a directive to establish training programs for those
displaced by the decreased profitability of the farming sector. Congress
could have given incentives to businesses operating in particularly
affected areas. Generous unemployment benefits or government
assistance could be temporarily put in place to alleviate the human
suffering attendant to the current conditions. 194
However, the Farm Bill affects prices, by giving to qualified producers
direct payments based on formulas laid out in the bill that take into
account acreage farmed; also, a variety of other considerations are based
on different agricultural staples produced. 95 The Farm Bill protects
American farmers from foreign competition, forcing foreign farmers
189. See Afilalo, supra note 168, at 784.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. See generally Importance of Trade for Agriculture, U.S. FOREIGN AGRICULTURAL
SERVICE I June 2002, available at
http://wwwfas.usda.gov/info/factsheets/FPA/economy.html (last visited Sept. 18, 2004).
193. Afilalo, supra note 168, at 784.
194. Id. at 784-85.
195. Id. at 785.
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(particularly farmers in developing countries) to bear the consequences of
the suppressed market.9 6
C. Provisions of the Farm Bill of 2002
The passage of the U.S. Farm Bill may result in many developing
countries viewing the United States in a worse light than they view the
subsidy rich European Union."" One reason for this is that the U.S. Farm
Bill provides for an increase in subsidies to large cotton and grain farmers,
an area in which developing countries in particular are striving to
compete. 98 Accordingly, to insure that the wealthy producers benefit the
most, the bill imposes a limit of $360,000 per farmer, which is subject to
numerous exceptions. 9 The bill also has provisions for conservation, food
stamps, and food labeling.2°° Contrary to the 1996 Freedom to Farm Law,
passed under the Clinton Administration, which sought to eliminate
subsidies allowing the market to dictate prices and production, the U.S.
Farm Bill appears to push in the opposite direction, discouraging
production based on market demands.2°1 It is estimated that over the next
six years the bill will cost $100 billion and nearly $200 billion over the next
202ten years. While some of this outlay will undoubtedly go to conservation
and other efforts provided for in the bill, the majority of the funds are
• • 203
likely to go to large and inefficient agribusiness.
D. Adverse Impact
Perhaps the most detrimental result of subsidizing the farm sector is
that it encourages farmers to produce irrespective of the market
204demands. When market prices are low, instead of American farmers
producing less to conform to the demands of the market, the U.S. Farm
Bill encourages farmers to continue production, thus flooding the market
with an excess of agricultural products, further lowering prices. This
surplus has had other negative effects on the world markets such as
196. Id.
197. See Mitra, supra note 9.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Mitra, supra note 9.
204. Afilalo, supra note 168, at 785.
205. See generally id.
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dumping surpluses on already saturated markets, and consequently,S 206
lowering the price of the products for importing countries.
Additionally, some have argued that the U.S. Farm Bill actually
impairs American farmers' production.20 7  However, this assessment is
made with the caveat that it is not the conglomerate agricultural producers
that are negatively impacted, but the small operation farmers."' "[Tlhe
new bill fails the nation's family farmers, consumers, taxpayers, and
environment[,] . . . further destabilize[ing] family farmers and rural
communities around the world."2°9
In the early twentieth century, one quarter of the United States
population lived on American farms."O Today, only two percent of the
population occupy and work rural farmland. 2 ' This dramatic change in the
composition of rural America inversely parallels the exponential growth of
212
commercial farming enterprises. Approximately eight percent of the
total number of American farms account for, in excess of, seventy percent
of agricultural sales. The bill does little to help the independent owners
of small and medium sized farms in rural America; in fact, the bill seems to
211turn its back on these farmers. Some have termed the U.S. Farm Bill
"agribusiness welfare" since it gives primarily to the large producers2"'
The same commentator aptly titled his article "Giving Away the Farm"
because in effect the Farm Bill robs from the poor independent farmer and
216gives to the rich agribusiness conglomerates. In contrast, proponents
hold that although the new spending levels seem high, that when all of the
ad hoc programs and additional expenditures of past years are taken into
account, the new U.S. Farm Bill does not expend more domestic resources
217than the government did before the bill. Even so, how does this justify
the certain destruction of family farms and those that are connected with
small farming?
206. See generally U.S. DUMPING, supra note 142.
207. Anuradha Mittal, Giving Away the Farm: The 2002 Farm Bill, 8 FOOD FIRST: INST.
FOR FOOD & DEV. POL'Y, BACKGROUNDER 1 (Summer 2002), available at
http://www.foodfirst.org/pubsbackgrdrs/2002/sO2v8n3.pdf (last visited Oct. 15, 2004).
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Mittal, supra note 207.
214. Mitra, supra note 8.
215. Mittal, supra note 207.
216. See generally id.
217. See Farm Bill, supra note 87.
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Furthermore, the new bill only enhances and exaggerates the existing
inequities between the one family farmer and the large operation
corporate farmers. "The top 10 percent of farm-subsidy recipients
collect two-thirds of the money, and the bottom 80 percent get just one-
sixth. Forty-seven percent of commodity payments will go to large farms
with average household incomes of $135,000. Moreover, most crops are
not eligible for subsidy payments. ' ,219 Most of the money doled out by the
Farm Bill goes to producers of cotton, wheat, rice, and barley. 2 ' Because
most of the federal funding will go to large agricultural producers, the
average American farmer will receive surprisingly little of the benefit this
bill seeks to provide, while that same farmer will help bear the cost of the
bill.221
Some argue that these measures are nothing more than an uncertain
administration buying votes from the farm belt and the big business slant
12to the legislation has precisely that flavor. That aside, even some
conservative lawmakers believe that the likely result may be that the large
farms, equipped with generous subsidies will buy out the small farms that
the bill purports to save.223 The damage caused by the U.S. Farm Bill could
mean the end of small independent farming upon which American
agriculture was built. 24
IV. TRADE LIBERALIZATION
Proponents of trade liberalization maintain that implementation of
tariff reductions and the elimination of subsidies will have an aggregate
effect of stimulating world trade and investment as well as a more efficient
use of resources.22 The WTO Secretariat has estimated that of the many
benefits of the implementation of these regulations, world merchandise
trade is expected to increase between nine percent and twenty-four
226percent by 2005.
218. Mittal, supra note 207.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. See generally Mitra, supra note 9.
222. See generally Mittal, supra note 207.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. WTO SECRETARIAT, supra note 31, at 144.
226. Id. at 148-49. The projected rates of increase were predicted using a variety of models.
See generally id. at 149-51.
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A. The European Union
1. Common Agriculture Policy
Like the United States, and indeed the rest of the world, Europe faced
an uncertain market for all goods in the post-World War II era.27 To
battle these uncertainties and develop food security, in 1962 Europe
introduced the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP),2 8 Its implementation
led to deliberate increases in agricultural production and reduced reliance
on imports.229  As expected and as evidenced by the United States
continued use of subsidies, production increased beyond the demands of
the market, resulting in surpluses, leading to increasingly heavy
230government expenditures.
Of course this was not the intention of the CAP, which was actually
intended to stabilize markets, assure that necessary supplies were readily
available, ensure reasonable prices for consumers, and to increase
-. 231
agriculture production. To alleviate some of the inequities caused by the
CAP, Europe offered to reform some of its policies in the Agenda 2000
232Agreement. The resulting changes included shifts from price supports to
direct payments,233 reductions in economic distortions, and the formulation
of a European Union rural development policy.2 4 The Council of
European Union Agriculture Ministers met in 2003 to again negotiate
changes to the CAP because it is still an "extremely expensive policy and is
insufficient to meet the challenges posed by the World Trade
Organization. 235
2. The European Union Imports and Exports
The fifteen countries comprising the European Union import
approximately $60 billion in agricultural goods per year. 36 Unlike the
227. See generally Common Agricultural Policy (CAP): From Creation to the Present Day,
UK DEPARTMENT FOR ENVIRONMENT FOOD AND RURAL AFFAIRS, at
http://www.defra.gov.uk/farmlcapreform/index.htm (on file with author).
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. See Afilato, supra note 168, at 784.
234. Common Agriculture Policy (CAP): From Creation to the Present Day, supra note 227.
235. Id.
236. Press Release, European Union, Facts and Figures on EU Trade in Agricultural
Products: Open to Trade, Open to Developing Countries (Dec. 12, 2002), available at
http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/02/296&format=HT
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United States and many other wealthy nations, the European Union is the
"largest importer of farm products from developing" nations."' Europe is
responsible for importing over two thirds of Africa's agricultural exports
and nearly half of the agricultural products exported from Latin
America. 38 In the mid 1980s Europe's stocks of several commodities, such
as beef, butter, and wheat, far exceeded their domestic need, so they
promoted exports through the use of subsidies."' Similar to the effects of
the U.S. Farm Bill, this type of export promotion set Europe's domestic
prices above the world market prices that would have existed in its
absence.2 4 Consequently, in part to effectuate economic self-preservation
through negotiations, at the recent Cancun, Mexico negotiations, the
European Union sought to retain a portion of its export subsidies, saying
that the proposals on the table for negotiations were unbalanced.24 ' The
European Union provides extensive support to its farmers, primarily
through "trade-distorting" support accounting for more than half of the
242
support provided 4. Additionally, the European Union relies on the $2
billion per year it spends on export subsidies to eliminate surplus
production, thus driving down world market prices.24'
Without doubt, the inequitable subsidies provided under the
protective guise of the European Union's CAP have a significant adverse
244
affect on world markets . In fact,
[a] withdrawal of agricultural support in industrialized countries would
reduce the surplus in output and, thereby, raise world prices of
agricultural commodities. The removal of subsides [sic] under CAP, for
instance, would induce two key changes. First, domestic EC agricultural
prices would fall from artificially raised levels. Second, the resultant
decline in EC agricultural output would exert an upward pressure on
the free trade world prices. That this rise in world prices would benefit
ML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en (last visited Sept. 19, 2004) [hereinafter
EU Trade in Agricultural Products].
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Kaul, supra note 54, at 396-97.
240. Id.
241. Naomi Koppel, WTO Document Proposes Ending Farm Export Subsidies, A. P.
NEWSWIRES, Feb. 12, 2003, available at
http://www.tradeobservatory.orgfheadlines.cfmReflD=18025.
242. USTR Describes Farm Bill, supra note 79. The European Union has a domestic
support ceiling of $60 billion per year, and Japan has a ceiling approaching $30 billion
compared to the U.S ceiling of $19.1 billion per year. Farm Bill, supra note 87.
243. USTR Describes Farm Bill, supra note 79.
244. Common Agriculture Policy (CAP): From Creation to the Present Day, supra note 227.
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developing countries that are net-exporters of agricultural commodities
via terms of trade improvement is an established fact.
Although, not clear from the recent Cancun negotiations, this is the
reason that the European Union is taking steps to reform with the primary
goal of "reduce[ing] the overall burden of the CAP ... and making world
trade fairer. 24 6
B. World Markets
In the wake of the passage of the U.S. Farm Bill, the balance of world
trade is likely to shift in the United States favor.247 Many economists fear
that the generous United States subsidies will drive down essential
commodity prices.2 s Unfortunately, the U.S. Farm Bill was passed while
United States policies imposing tariffs on steel imports were still under
scrutiny and criticism. 249 At the signing of the bill, President George W.
Bush commented: "[t]his bill is generous and will provide a safety net for
farmers, and it will do so without encouraging overproduction and
depressing prices. It will allow farmers and ranchers to plan and operate
based on market realities, not Government dictates. 2 s° In contrast, many
critics still maintain that subsidies at high levels, such as those set by the
U.S. Farm Bill, lead to overproduction.2 1 American farmers produce far
more crops than the domestic or even the export markets demand; this
flood of excess commodities lowers prices.2 Currently, the United States
federal government is the source of more than forty percent of all net farm
income.253 This crutch encourages producers to seek the highest possible
amount of federal aid, thus encouraging them to plant high yield crops,
254
whether or not the market demands those crops to satisfy its needs.
245. Kaul, supra note 54, at 397.
246. Common Agriculture Policy (CAP): From Creation to the Present Day, supra note 227.
247. Farah Khan, US Farm Bill Will Drive Down Prices in Africa, AFROL NEWS, May 15,
2002, at http://www.afrol.com/News2002/afrOl2 us-farmbill.htm (last visited Sept. 18, 2004).
248. Id.
249. New U.S. Farm Bill Upsets WTO Partners, Could Hurt Developing Countries,
BRIDGES WKLY. TRADE NEWS DIG., May 15, 2002, available at
http://www.ictsd.org/weekly/02-05-15/story2.htm (last visited Sept. 11, 2004) [hereinafter
New U.S. Farm Bill Upsets WTO Partners].
250. President George W. Bush, Statement upon signing the Farm Security and Rural
Investment Act (May 13, 2002) (transcript available at 38 WKLY. COMPILATION of PRES.
Doc, 808).
251. Mittal, supra note 208.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id.
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Additionally, commentators have noted that "US subsidies are being
granted on exactly the commodities where the [African] continent could
be competitive," such as cotton as evidenced by the demands of many
African countries in the Cancun negotiations."'
World markets can only bear so much of the unbalanced Unites
States' subsidizing tactics before countries like South Africa, who have
consistently obeyed the liberalizing edicts of both the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, are forced out of the
market.! Additionally, the Mercosur, the large trading bloc of
agricultural countries in Latin America, will also suffer from the Farm
Bill.257 Forecasts predict that Argentina and Brazil will suffer losses of
approximately $39 billion due to the drop in commodity prices resulting
251from the bill. While the United States is the largest producer of soy,
controlling thirty percent of the market, Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay
follow with a substantial portion of the market and stand to suffer injury
259from the market distortion caused by the U.S. Farm Bill. Of course,
countries like those in the Mercosur group or the Cairns group can
challenge the U.S. Farm Bill at WTO meetings, but an effort to challenge
such legislation may further hinder, or even breakdown the already
volatile negotiations, as well as proving fruitless as evidenced by some of
the demands made by African nations during the Cancun trade round.
C. Specific Proposals
The United States has made numerous proposals regarding
agriculture and the elimination of subsidies and reduction of tariffs
throughout the Doha Negotiation Rounds."' Most recently, the United
States proposed the complete elimination of export subsidies over a five
year period. 262 Additionally, the United States has dealt with the problem
of excessive tariffs in the non-agricultural arena.2" The approach to the
problem may be summarized by stating that the United States intends to
255. Khan, supra note 247.
256. Id.
257. New U.S. Farm Bill Upsets WTO Partners, supra note 249.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. See generally id.
261. See generally WTO SECRETARIAT, supra note 31.
262. The U.S. WTO Agriculture Proposal, supra note 172.
263. WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, MARKET ACCESS FOR NON-AGRICULTURAL
PRODUCTS, COMMUNICATION FROM THE UNITED STATES, available at
http://www.aeanet.org/GovernmentAffairs/gaam0l91-wTOmarketaccessfornonagproducts
Feb03lof2.asp (last visited Sept. 18, 2004).
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ensure market access opportunities for all WTO Members and encourage
participation by all Members in the liberalization process.264  The
parameters of the approach are (1) a comprehensive approach, with no
exclusions for some products, (2) an initial phase of tariff reduction and
elimination, (3) a second phase that would eliminate all remaining tariffs,
(4) participation by all WTO Members, and (5) the non-tariff barriers on a
parallel track.211 Many maintain that "world-wide elimination of tariffs will
significantly benefit developing country Members, particularly for non-
agricultural products, which account for 89 percent of exports from
developing countries.,, 266 By most estimates, the World Bank believes that
a large majority of the benefit of tariff elimination would go to low-
167income, developing countries. It seems reasonable to draw a parallel
between tariffs and subsidies, both of which are artificial measures to
promote domestic market stability at the expense of other world markets.
It follows that the elimination of subsidies would effectively unburden
many of the developing countries that suffer from the unbalanced market
conditions generated by subsidies, just as the elimination of tariffs will.
D. Deficiencies and Conflicts with the 2002 U.S. Farm Bill
Some commentators argue that although elimination of tariffs and
subsidies may be a respectable endeavor, it is ultimately not the answer.268
Many believe that leaving "farmers at the mercy of the free market [will]
only hasten their demise."26 9 An agricultural bubble economy is created.
Inevitably, it crashes as subsidies fail to keep pace with failing crop prices.
Farms go bankrupt. Free trade in agriculture starves our farmers.27"
Again looking to tariffs, a United States proposal seeks to eliminate
tariffs in two phases over a ten year span.17 1 The first phase will begin in
2005 and end in 2010, during which the United States proposes an
elimination of all tariffs of five percent or less, elimination of tariffs on
highly traded goods which account for sixty percent of the United States
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. See generally, Mittal, supra note 207, at 5.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, TRADE FACTS: UNITED STATES
PROPOSES A TARIFF-FREE WORLD 1 (2003), available at
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document-Library/Fact-Sheets/2002/asset-upload-fie286-5653.
pdf (last visited on Sept. 19, 2004) [hereinafter TRADE FACTS].
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exports, and cut remaining tariffs to less than eight percent. 2 The second
phase spanning the years between 2010 and 2015 will seek to reduce the
remaining tariffs to zero."'
The United States and world markets stand to benefit from the
eventual elimination of tariffs.274 Some studies suggest that the elimination
of tariffs on consumer and industrial products will boost the United States
economy by $95 billion. 75 Additionally, the study suggests that exports of
these goods would also spur increases in the amount of $83 billion.2"
Increases of this magnitude will undoubtedly have a ripple effect, creating
more jobs and possibly increasing wages for many workers. 27' The world's
poor will also benefit from the elimination of tariffs, lifting an estimated
300 million people out of poverty.278 As stated previously, developing
countries stand to benefit the most from a trade-free world market.
211
Developing countries could realize an aggregate gain of $500 billion.2 
However, these benefits would come primarily from liberalization of tariffs
among these developing countries, 2 1 because many developing countries
have tariffs on their products, and they primarily export from other
developing countries; thus, they stand to gain most from tariff
elimination."2 Taken together, this could mean an increase in per capita
income of more than 2.5 percent. 18' Additionally, these measures would
serve to level the playing field in the global economy.8,
E. United States Perspective
In contrast to the world perspective, the United States local, and
contra-globalization view holds that financial gains aside, support to
American farmers will be beneficial. How is the U.S. Farm Bill
advantageous? Beyond the obvious, the U.S. Farm Bill, like much
economic legislation, will have a substantial ripple effect, felt throughout
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. See generally id.
275. Id. at 2.
276. Id.
277. TRADE FACTS supra note 271, at 3.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. TRADE FAcTs, supra note 271, at 3.
284. See id.
285. See generally COHEN ET AL., supra note 2.
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286the market. Increased exports will result in more American jobs (as well
as import related jobs in foreign countries) with the potential for higher
than average wages, impacting numerous professions and communities
beyond the rural community. 7  Since the United States agriculture
economy is twice as dependent on exports as the general economy, it
follows that any measure to encourage and support exports will be
beneficial.'& One study indicated that "[n]early half of our wheat and rice
crops are exported; about one-third of soybean, tobacco and cotton
production is shipped overseas; and 20 percent of the corn crop is
exported."'' 9 The study further indicates that other areas of agriculture are
becoming more and more dependent on foreign markets.2 However, the
benefits seem to end at the American frontier, and developing countries
and other WTO Member Nations do not reap the same benefits, instead
they suffer increased economic damage. 9'
Similarly, the United States supports the elimination of tariffs because
the
[e]limination of tariffs would turn world ports into a giant duty-free
shop, with nearly $6 trillion in world trade becoming duty free. The
World Bank [further] estimates that removing all [trade] barriers to
goods trade would expand the global economy by $830 billion by 2015.
This represents a 2.5% annual increase in world per capita income,
about $136 dollars for every person in the world. 92
Some have argued that more damage is done to developing countries
by other developing countries that enforce tariffs. According to the
World Bank, approximately seventy percent of tariffs paid are paid to
developing countries, by developing countries. 94  But still, most critics
attack the tariffs and subsidies of the European Union and the United
States. "[T]he WTO recently reported, high tariffs impart an anti-export
bias, hampering a country's ability to grow through exports. 295
286. See generally Importance of Trade for Agriculture, supra note 192.
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288. Id.
289. Id.
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291. See generally id.
292. Michael W. Michalak, Address at Reitaku University (Jan. 21, 2003), available at
http://japan.usembassy.gov/e/p/tp-20030121cl.html (last visited Sept. 17, 2004).
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F European Union Perspective
Like the United States, the European Union is reluctant to open its
agricultural markets. 29 6 However, recently the European Union has been
proposing CAP reform and subsidy cuts of up to sixty percent.2" The
European Union has recognized that the non-tariff measures often affectS - 291
up to forty percent of trade in agriculture. However, while
acknowledging that these measures adversely affect many developing
countries, the European Union denies that it is the primary user of such299
measures. In fact, it, like the United States, places the blame on other
nations, such as Japan and Latin American countries that have escalated
protective measures.300
The European Union has issued a number of proposals that may
eventually alleviate the already economically debilitating effects of the
protective measures.3 1 The European Union wants WTO Members to
commit to "provide[ing] duty-free and quota-free access to their markets
for all imports from the Least Developed Countries. '3 2 European leaders
had hoped that this measure would be agreed upon and implemented after
the Cancun negotiations, but nothing regarding agriculture was
implemented.3 °4 The Union also proposed commitments such as, clarified
precautionary measures, reduced tariff escalation for products of interest
to developing countries (e.g. cotton and grain in some African countries),
and a reduction in the average tariff by thirty-six percent."'
As for subsidies, the European Union's position is clear.30  They
maintain that the budgetary expenditures for export subsidies have fallen
in the last decade from twenty-five percent in 1992 to slightly over five
percent in 2001.307 They further contend that since the Uruguay Round,
they have faithfully upheld their commitments to reducing the levels of all
296. USTR Zoellick Seeking Agriculture Trade Compromise with EU, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
STATE, July 30, 2003, at http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/econ/wto/03073001.htm (last visited
Sept. 17, 2004) [hereinafter Zoellick Seeking Agriculture Trade].
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protective measures.38 However, they are also careful to note that while
"the EU exports at world prices to global markets. ... [T]he EU does not
set these prices. These are set by global market conditions, which, for food
security crops, are dominated by a few big exporting developed countries,
like the US."3 9 The European Union continued to defend their market
participation, even if subsidized, saying that at times when they have
withdrawn from the market due to apparent injustices, another
competitive nation filled their space, and essentially no change took
place."3
V. CONCLUSION
The question that begs to be asked is whether the United States and
its flawed U.S. Farm Bill, and the apparent contradiction to its stated
WTO commitments, is at fault for the detriment suffered by so many
developing nations; or is it the European Union's lackadaisical approach to
reform that should be faulted. Obviously, both of the major world market
players defer their responsibility to the other, while claiming to take the
moral high ground if only in degrees relative to the path taken by the
other. One commentator has said that,
[a]griculture and food are fundamental to the well-being of all people,
both in terms of access to safe and nutritious food and as foundations of
healthy communities, cultures, and environment.... Instead of
ensuring the right to food for all, these institutions have created a
system that prioritizes exportoriented [sic] production and has increased
global hunger and poverty while alienating millions from productive
assets and resources such as land, water, and seeds."'
It is time that both the United States and the European Union start to
implement and honor the commitments made to developing countries at
the WTO negotiations, the only forum in which they have a legitimate
voice to effectuate change.
The United States proposals suggest two primary phases, the first
phase calls for the elimination of export subsidies over a five year period,
thus reducing worldwide tariffs and trade-distorting support, and the
second phase calls for a complete elimination of all tariffs and forms of
trade distorting domestic support.' The World Bank believes that a large
308. Id.
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2004]
TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L.
majority of the benefits of tariff and subsidies elimination would go to low-
income, developing countries. 313 Ensuring that these developing countries
are the ones that benefit is taking the moral high ground. During the first
eighteen months of his Administration, President George W. Bush's
policies undercut all hopes of economic relief to be garnered from the
WTO's goals of trade liberalization.314 The U.S. Farm Bill ensures that the
United States prices for many exported products will continue to remain
artificially low." Additionally, the expenditures given to American
farmers, allowing them to compete effectively on the world markets will be
offset by the proposed foreign aid to be given to Africa, one of the
316
countries primarily damaged by the depressed market. One of the
primary areas in which African farmers are trying to compete and would
317be able to compete if given the opportunity is cotton production. Some
have even said that African farmers would actually "have a competitive
advantage in the absence of America's unfair trade practices., 31" The
current United States Administration supports a continuing program that
is costing American taxpayers billions annually and is being used to
subsidize only a few already wealthy and politically powerful corporate
farmers."' All of this seems to contradict President Bush's purported
desire to route out poverty, and his interests in the nations that struggle
with poverty because of their inability to compete in the world markets. 2
In fact, "[t]he surplus created by this . . .form of rural workfare is then
dumped on world markets, at a grievous cost to 10 million West African
cotton farmers.,
321
One of the most important things that must be remembered is that all
146 Members of the WTO need to work toward liberalization.22
According to Trade Representative Zoellick, "[w]e all have to figure out
how we [can] open markets and liberalize together recognizing that for
developing countries . . . it is appropriate to do this in a way that
recognizes their special situation.,
323
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